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Introduction 
The 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization was developed during 
the Uruguay Round, a series of trade negotiations among 125 countries spanning seven 
and a half years. The Agreement specifies the purpose of the WTO, its functions, 
structure, and legal status, and provides for a Secretariat. The preamble text states that 
parties to the Agreement recognize that, "their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily ' growing volume of real income and effective 
demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing 
for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the envirorunent and to 
enhance the means for doing so in a marUler consistent with their respective needs and 
concems at different levels of economic development". 
The WTO's rules - or agreements - are also the result of negotiations between its 
members. The current set of agreements is the outcome of the 1986-94 Uruguay Round 
negotiations. Among the functions of the WTO outlined in the Agreement Establishing 
the World Traqe Organization are the facilitation of implementation of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements and the furthering of their objectives; the provision of a forum for 
negotiations among WTO members; and the administration of a mechanism for settling 
disputes. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
The original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, now referred to as "GATT 1947", 
provided the basic rules of the multilateral trading system from I January 1948 until the 
World Trade Organization entered into force on I January 1995. The 1986-94 Uruguay 
Round · negotiations included a major revision of the original GAIT. "GATT 1994" is 
now the agreement under the WTO that deals with trade in goods (whereas WTO as a 
whole also covers other aspects of trade, such as services and intellectual property). 
GA IT 1994 sets out the main WTO rules that have a specific bearing on trade in goods, 
thereby providing the basis for multilateral trade in the same. The two fundamental 
principles of GAIT are reflected in its Articles III, and I both of which are intended to 
enhance and protect liberalized trade among party nations. According to the "Most-
favored Nation" (MFN) obligation, expressed in GAIT Article I, member nations must 
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unconditionally grant all other member nations equal trade advantages for like products. 
In other words, there is to be no discrimination in .the way one Member State treats other 
member States in relation to matters covered by GATT. The fundamental GATT 
principle enshrined in Article III is known as the "National Treatment" obligation. This 
obligation ensures that members of GATT treat imported products no less favorably than 
"like" domestic products, so as to allow domestic and imported products to compete on 
an equal basis. Other substantive GATT requirements of relevance to RFO trade 
measures are contained in Articles V and XI. Article V (2) guarantees freedom of transit 
through the territory of each WTO Member State, "via the routes most convenient for 
international transit". This provision might apply to vessels of a WTO member State 
seeking to land their catch in another member State before transpOliing it on to a third 
State. Article XI of GATT prohibits, with certain very specific exceptions, quantitative 
restrictions on the import and e'xport of products. This latter provision has been germane 
to most environmental disputes within GA TT/WTO. 
The requirements of the GATT Articles outlined above have a bearing on RFO 
, conservation measures that distinguish between countries, create differences between 
imported and domestic products, restrict landing or transshipment rights, or create import 
or export restrictions. However, there is an additional consideration, namely that 
requirements of the GATT Articles mentioned are subject to the conditions of GATT 
Article XX, which outlines a set of general exceptions to GATT's substantive 
requirements. The most relevant parts of Article XX read as follows: "Subject to the 
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures: 
1. Necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
2. Necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations, which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, 
3. Relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restriction on domestic production or 
consumption." 
Articles I, 'III, and XI of GATT would be likely to apply to many of the restrictions and 
other requirements relating to the importation of fish products described in the previous 
chapter, but the question is whether the provisions of these Articles would be covered by 
the general exceptions provided for under GATT Article XX. This is further examined in 
the following chapter of this report (Processes and likely outcomes). 
The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) 
The TBT Agreement comprises disciplines (i .e. rules) for setting and enforcing technical 
standards, so as to reduce restrictions on international trade. The Agreement fosters the 
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harmonization of technical requirements by favoring the use of international standards. 
The TBT Agreement distinguishes between a "technical regulation", which "lays down 
product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the 
applicable administrative provisions" xli and compliance with which is mandatory; and 
"standards", which are similar to technical regulations, except that compliance is not 
. mandatory. xlii In principle, an RFO instrument can include both technical regulations 
and standards. For example, many RFO trade measures designed to support compliance, 
including documentation systems such as the CDS, are binding and therefore might be 
considered as "technical regulations". Other provisions, such as encouraging port States 
to use vessel-monitoring systems to verify where catches were taken, might be 
considered as "standards". When a WTO member adopts, or expects to adopt, technical 
regulations for a product, it is required to participate, within the limits of its resources, in 
efforts to set international standards for that product. xli ii If "relevant international 
standards" exist, then members must use these as a basis for their technical regulations, 
unless these standards would be "ineffecti ve or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of 
the legitimate objectives pursued". xliv Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement explicitly 
recognizes the protection of "human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment" as legitimate objectives. A technical regulation for legitimate objectives 
that is based on international standards is "rebuttably presumed not to create an 
unnecessary obstacle to international trade". Xlvi The key issue in relation to RFOs is 
whether their rules would be considered "international" standards. Although the 
Agreement does not define what is meant by "international standards", the TBT 
Committee has adopted a Decision, which provides some guidance. Xlvi These criteria 
include transparency, openness, impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and relevance, 
coherence, and taking account of developing country concerns. 
Technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures must obey the MFN and 
National Treatment obligations (see pages 7-8) . Xlvii In addition, such regulations "shall 
not be more tr\ide, restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking 
account of the risks nonfulfillment would create". Xlvii Proposed technical regulations 
that are not 'based on international standards and that may hav~ a significant effect on 
trade are to be communicated to other WTO members through the WTO Secretariat, so as 
to allow them to provide comments. xlix To date, no notifications of technical regulations 
based on RFO rules have been received by the WTO Secretariat, suggesting either that 
WTO members consider these as "international standards", or that they do not have a 
significant effect on trade. It could also be that the notification requirements are not being 
fully complied with. In the case of "standards", the Code of Good Practice for the 
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards, annexed t9 the WTO Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, is to be followed if a central government standardizing body 
establishes the standard. If the standard is set by a non-governmental organization 
(NGO), reasonable efforts are to be taken by governments to ensure that these comply 
with the Codeli. As with the mandatory technical regulations, the Code expresses a 
preference for international standards. 
Certification and labeling programmes operated by governments, such as the case of 
certification and labeling stemming from AIDCP (see page 6), would be considered 
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"standards" for the purposes of the TBT, since they are not mandatory. Other certification 
programmes operational in the fisheries sector, such as that of the Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC), would also be considered as standards. 
The most controversial aspect of certification and labeling is whether voluntary initiati v.es 
involving "non-product-related production and processing methods" are covered by the 
TBT Agreement. Non product- related production and processing methods (PPMs) are 
those PPMs that do not form part of the physical characteristics of the end product. For 
example, the subject of Principle 3 of the MSC Principles and Criteria would be likely to 
be considered a non-product-related PPM, since it relates to an intangible aspect of 
fishery. 
It states, "The fishery is subject to an effective management system that respects local, 
national and international laws and standards and incorporates institutional and 
operational frameworks that require use of the resource to be responsible and 
sustainable." If non-product-related PPMs are indeed covered by the TBT Agreement, 
then some of the disciplines in the Code of Good Practice might interfere with voluntary 
certification and labeling schemes that are based on such PPMs. These disciplines include 
the non-discrimination in relation to "like products" and the avoidance of unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade depending on how these terms are interpreted. So far, 
there is no consensus as to whether such PPMs are indeed covered by the TBT 
agreement. 
Relevant GATT I WTO jurisprudence 
The rulings in several WTO disputes have been based on interpretation of most of the 
GATT provisions already referred to but, so far, there is no WTO jurisprudence on 
Article V. The European Communities (EC) did file a complaint based on Article V 
against Chile, in 2000, because Chile was denying port facilities to European ships 
carrying Swordfish. However, that case was settled before a WTO panel was convened to 
adjudicate it. It is perhaps noteworthy that a significant percentage of GATT/WTO cases 
pertaining to GATT Articles I, III, XI, and XX have concerned disputes over fish , which 
reflects the important international nature of the fisheries trade. None of these cases have 
directly involved a conservation measure adopted by an RFO; indeed, no cases directly 
based on an MEA have been heard by the WTO. However, in all these cases, GATT and 
WTO panels have indicated a preference for the use of multilaterally agreed trade 
measures to achieve environmental objectives, rather than trade measures taken 
unilaterall y. 
The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body establishes panels and an "Appellate Body" to hear 
cases and adjudicate disputes. The Appellate Body is a standing body, composed of 
independent experts, whereas panels are made up on a case-by-case basis. Once a case 
has been heard by a panel, g plaintive member involved in a dis.~ute may appeal against 
the panel ruling to the Appellate Body, which reviews question] of law, but cannot re-
open questions of fact. In all environmental cases concerning GATT Articles I, III and 
XI, the panels and Appellate Body quickly found that the environmental provisions at 
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issue had violated one or more of those Articles. Accordingly, all the cases have turned 
on the application of Article XX, the interpretation of which has evolved over time. 
Disputes involving the afore-mentioned provisions date back to the J980s,lv however it 
was the well-known 1991 Tuna-Dolphin Case that triggered worldwide concern about 
potential incompatibilities between the international trade regime and environmental 
conservation. That case concerned US import restrictions imposed on Mexican tuna 
caught using purse-seine nets, which, it was fo und, violated GAIT Article XI - and were 
not otherwise allowed in accordance with exceptions provided for under GAIT Article 
XX. Particularly difficult for the conservation community was the rationale used in 
interpreting GATT Article XX. Specifically, the ruling panel found that Article XX (b) 
(see page 8) could not be used to justify trade measures taken in respect of the 
environment, beyond national jurisdiction. The ruling in this case also followed the 
rulings of previous cases, namely that the word· "necessary" in Article XX (b) was to be 
interpreted as requiring the "least- trade-restrictive" measure, meaning that a measure 
could not be maintained if an alternative measure existed that was less trade restrictive. 
Following a set of WTO cases that fu rther developed the interpretation of Article XX, the 
WTO decision in the first Shrimp-Turtle Case, in 1998, is especially important. Iviii The 
dispute involved a US import ban on shrimp caught in a manner that was considered to 
endanger sea turtles, i.e. that did not involve the use of "turtle excluder devices" required 
of US fishers. The Appellate Body in that case found that the US measure was covered 
by Article XX (g), in that it aimed to conserve turtles (which fell within the definition of 
"natural resources"). However, the measure did not meet the requirements expressed in 
the chapeau of Article XX because, the Appellate Body determined, inter alia, that the 
US action aimed to influence the environmental policies of other countries in such a way 
that they should essentially adopt the same standards as the USA. This "imposition" of 
US policy was considered to be "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries". Another factor leading to this WTO ruling against the USA was the fact that 
the USA had not sought to find a multilateral solution to the environmental problem at 
the root of · the dispute. This case was important because, among other things, it 
consolidated a trend of interpreting Article XX in such a way that it became less difficult 
for an environmental measure to pass the "tests" in GATT Article XX (b) and (g) : 
however, the more significant tests are now to be found in the chapea1J of Article XX. 
WTO & Regional Fisheries Organization 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization 
dealing with the rules of trade between nations. WTO's agreements - or rules - are 
negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world's trading nations and are intended to help 
ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible. Regional fisheries 
organizations (RFOs) are affiliations of nations which co-ordinate efforts to manage 
fisheries in a region. RFOs may focus on certain species of fish (as in the case of the 
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Blue fin Tuna) or have a wider remit 
related to living marine resources in general within a region (as does the Commission for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living resources (CCAMLR), for example). This 
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report examines the relationship between the rules and regulations of RFOs and the- rules 
of the WTO. It seeks to identify possibilities of compatibility or conflict, and makes 
recommendations on how to minimize conflicts. 
RFO measures relating to trade (hereafter often referred to as "trade measures") are to be 
found in three repositories. Firstly, trade measures are contained within the RFO treaties 
themselves. For example, the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long 
Driftnets in the South Pacific ("Driftnet Convention") contains prohibitions on the 
imports and landing of fish caught using driftnets. A second, and more common, source 
of trade measures is the decisions and/or recommendations taken by the RFO 
commissions and, thirdly, RFO trade measures are contained in the various global 
instruments adopted to strengthen or reinforce RFOs. 
The relationship between the WTO and multilateral environment agreements (MEAs) in 
geI)eral has been on the international agenda for ov'er 10 years, and compatibility between 
the two sets of rules is still uncertain. Indeed, the effort to achieve mutual supportiveness 
is likely to continue for some time to come. The debate over the WTO-MEA interface 
generally relates to global MEAs - in other words the debate is about coherence at the 
global leveL Although trade measures stemming from regional agreements present a sub-
set of the general WTOIMEA problematic, this is not necessarily so for RFOs, most of 
which are open to any State fishing within the area covered by the treaty, including those 
from outside the region. 
To date, there has not been a WTO dispute over a measure stemming from an MEA or an 
RFO. Although one cannot, therefore, be certain how these will be treated by the WTO, 
recent WTO jurisprudence involving environmental issues sheds some light on how some 
of its relevant provisions will be interpreted.' However, that insight can be taken only so 
far, since most trade measures adopted so far by RFOs have been aimed at improving 
compliance with their. conservation and management measures, and there is relatively 
little experience in the WTO in addressing trade policy in the context of compliance with 
other treaties. 
The first chapter of this report describes the types of trade measures used or potentially 
used by RFOs; the second chapter assesses the potential for conflict between RFOs and 
WTO, including by examining the relevant WTO rules and the jurisprudence; the third 
chapter delves deeper into the legal considerations and possible scenarios involving RFO 
measures which could be challenged at the WTO; and the final chapter draws some 
conclusions and makes some recommendations. 
Types of Trade Measures used or Potentially used by RFOS 
Trade measures used, or potentially used, by RFOs aim to achieve various purposes, the 
most important of which . is to ensure compliance with their conservation and 
management regimes. As such, most trade measures are aimed at combating illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. These measures include: 
• Requiring specified documentation on catches, from all vessels, as a condition of 
landing or transshipments; 
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• Prohibiting landings and transshipments (to RFO parties) from particular vessels; 
and 
• Enacting trade-restrictive measures, for example import bans, against parties, or 
nonparties, in fish products cov~red by an RFO. 
Key international processes and instruments that address the relationship between WTO 
and environmental measures UN Conference on Envirolll1ent and Development 
(UNCED) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) . 
Both the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, adopted at UNCED in 1992, addressed the 
interface between trade and the environment. Ixix The key messages were based on an 
affirmation that both trade liberalization and environmental protection were necessary for 
sustainable development. As such, there was consensus at UNCED that an open 
economic system was necessary; environmental measures based on an international 
consensus were preferred; and that trade measures to achieve environmental objectives 
may sometimes be necessary, but should be based on certain principles so as to avoid 
trade distortions. These messages were reaffirmed at the UN Special Session of the 
General Assembly to Review and Appraise the Implementation of Agenda 21 ("Rio+5"), 
held in June 1997, with the caveat that Agenda 21 was not yet being fully implemented 
and that the benefits of the Uruguay Round to developing countries were less than 
expected. 
Trade and the environment was also a dominant theme in the run up to WSSD, held in 
2002. Although very controversial, little substantive progress was made on the 
relationship between WTO 'and environmental rules. The Plan of Action of the WSSD 
called for the ratification, accession and implementation of the Straddling Stocks 
Convention and the F AO Compliance Agreement. Although UNCED, Rio+5 and the 
WSSD did not specifically address the relationship between RFOs and the WTO, they are 
broadly relevant to the subject of this report in two main ways. Firstly, by discouraging 
unilateral trade measures, these meetings appear to have enhanced the legitimacy of trade 
measures adopted in multilateral fora, such as RFOs. The major caveat is that such 
measures should not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised 
restrictions on international trade. Secondly, these assemblies established that trade and 
environmental regimes should be mutually supportive in order to achieve sustainable 
development. This is the benchmark against which current and future negotiations ought 
to be measured. 
The WTO's New Doha Agenda for Fisheries 
Once again secret deals are being cut in back rooms by corporate-dominated and little 
known international trade groups that wi ll directly impact the lives of commercial 
fishermen and our industry for decades to come. In this ar.count we will explain that 
threat and help guide you through the 'trade-speak' maze as well as tell you what you can 
do to see that fishermen 's concerns are addressed. The outcome of this struggle really 
matters. What happens in this fight will directly affect your markets, your price and even 
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whether you will stilt be able to go fishing in the future. In one-way or another, the issue 
affects us all. 
After failing famously in Seattle in November 1999, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) finally succeeded in launching a new round of trade talks in November 200 I. 
Two years following the "Battle in Seattle," trade ministers from 140 nations agreed to 
expand the WTO's scope over fisheries pol icies worldwide. 
As recently signed in Doha, Qatar, world governments have now agreed to begin 
negotiations in key areas of fisheries policy, making these issues, which have 
traditionally been decided in local or national arenas, now an international trade agenda 
item. Everything from gear requirements to labeling requirements to fishermen's federal 
pensions could be impacted. Once again, fishing men and women, and the coastal 
communities they support, have been shoved out of the rule-making process and 
currently have no voice at the table (see the November, 1999 FN article "The World 
Trade Organization (WTO): Flying Under Fishermen's Radar," available on the Internet. 
The Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations (PCFFA) and the World 
Forum of Fish Harvesters & Fish workers (WFF) are important voices for sustainable 
fisheries and for fishing-dependent peoples worldwide. Like small farmers, fishing 
communities everywhere are by necessity uniting globally to defend their rights and to 
protect their traditional livelihoods from potential WTO attack. Global trade rules 
currently reflect mainly the interests of large multinational businesses who certainly -do 
not have the interests of commercial fishermen in mind. WTO rules now being proposed 
for the world's fisheries could also seriously restrict national governments' abilities to 
regulate their own fisheries,and prevent them from protecting those fisheries from 
rapacious multi-national corporations. 
Countless popular movements have roundly criticized the WTO as a threat to democracy 
and the public interes.t. By joining the WTO, our government restricts what its own 
citizens can do to sustain fisheries and fishing communities, as well as set limits on the 
behavior of large corporations. Thus fisheries policy-making is increasingly moving 
offshore, to the arena of international trade negotiations between nations. As a result, 
nearly every national fishery management policy, tool or conservation program that 
might restrict corporate access to fisheries or seafood markets could, potentially, be 
classified to be a violation of the rules of global free trade. 
Market Access: The Global Free-Fishing Agreement 
WTO bureaucrats and corporations already consider many of the policies that conserve 
fisheries (and the communities that depend on the resource) to be "barriers to free trade." 
Since conservation measures always imply some restrictions on harvest, the WTO's . 
market access agenda could undermine sustainable fisheries and livelihoods by 
weakening legal protections that promote natural resource conservation and communities. 
The forestry, fishing, and farming sectors are particularly likely to be impacted. Ongoing 
WTO negotiations for wider market access are broken down into two general categories: 
1) eliminating tariffs, and; 2) eliminating "Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs)". 
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Eliminating Tariffs 
In Seattle, trade ministers were pushing to finalize a deal to eliminate tariffs (import 
taxes) between nations. Critics pointed out that tariff elimination could also expose small-
scale fishing communities, whose survival depends on sustaining local fisheries, in a 
variety of ways. Lowering tariffs in the absence of adequate safeguards for marine 
ecosystems and for fishermen, for instance, could accelerate the death spiral of the 
world's fish stocks and fishing communities. 
Although the UN Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports increasingly dire ne~s 
about dwindling worldwide stocks, no assessment has yet been done on the biological 
health impacts on fish stocks that are being prioritized for tariff elimination. Nor has 
anyone even consulted the fishing communities themselves about what issues they want 
addressed. The Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations in the US has been 
unable to even obtain information on the status of these trade talks. Apparently the only 
ones who are kept aware of the WTO fisheries agenda are the very importers, processors, 
and distributors who are driving the "full market access" trade agenda via the WTO. 
Their goal is to be able to dominate local markets everywhere at the expense of local 
fishermen. 
Forest tariffs were an issue of great concern to protesters in Seattle, as ministers had 
prepared to finalize a deal that week. However, forest conservationists succeeded ., in 
getting the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to publish its first-ever 
environmental assessment of trade liberalization, released just before the 1999 Ministerial 
Summit. In the report, whi'ch was done by a timber industry-funded group, trade officials 
buried the real findings: tariff reductions would result in increased logging in some of the 
world's most threatened old-growth forests inhabited by indigenous peoples or home for , 
important salmon ' streams. Precipitous WTO tariff elimination could also undermine 
efforts to reduce wood, oil and other resource consumption, a priority identified by the 
1992 UN Rio Earth Summit. 
The U.S. recently imposed a 29 p.ercent tariff on the important of Canadian softwood 
lumber to protect against the dumping of Canadian government subsidized lumber on the 
U.S. market, putting many rural logging-dependent comm'Unities out of work. However, 
many countries are joining Canada to attack those tariffs within the WTO process. In 
addition to forest and fish products, tariff cuts are also bemg discussed for minerals, 
fuels, chemicals, and other "non-agricultural products." Withbut any clue as to the 
impacts of expanding trade in these controversial commodities, the WTO is potentially 
putting the planet's future at risk. 
Cutting tariffs reduces prices for consumers, in tum stimulating consumption, especially 
in the rich nations where tariffs are highest. This could be disastrous for fisheries. In third 
world nations it creates pressures on government to export fish otherwise intended for 
local markets or simply sell quotas to foreign fleets to the detriment of local fishing 
fleets. In' turn, these cheap imports hurt fishermen in the wealthy countries by driving 
their e;c-vessel prices down and subjecting them to a type of third world poverty. Also, 
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some of America's oldest fisheries conservation programs (like the 1954 Saltonstall-
Kennedy Act) that are financed by tariff revenues could face difficulty in securing 
continued funding. 
Eliminating Non Tariff Measures (NTMs) 
The most dangerous thrust to fishermen of world trade agreements is the covert effort, by 
some countries who want to flood our markets, to include just about anything that might 
keep them out as a "non-tariff measure" or "NTM." In trade-speak, NTMs are considered 
to be any government measure, policy, or practice that has the effect of "distorting" trade. 
Obviously this definition is wide open to interpretation and abuse. 
Proposed lists of fishing NTMs by some countries have included measures such as 
normal and biologically necessary harvesting restrictions, bans on destructive gear, 
precautionary measures against the impo~ of species suspected of disease or illness, 
residency requirements ("fish here, live here" provisions), and even ecolabels. The Asia 
Pacific Economic Community (or APEC, which includes the U.S.) has already surveyed 
what it considers the various NTMs in Pacific Rim markets, with a view to using its list 
as a framework for negotiations on market access in the WTO. Governments have yet to 
make this NTM report public, however, as it could reveal a laundry list of important 
fisheries regulatory or conservation measures being targeted for elimination via WTO 
negotiations. Yet the United States Trade Representative (USTR) plans to also use this 
still-secret APEC laundry list as a "negotiating framework" for upcoming market access 
talks in Geneva. 
In the forestry sector, the WTO official definition of NTMs already extends to measures 
that may have a "potential" to impact trade, such as labeling requirements. Although they 
admittedly have not yet had any impact on trade, eco-Iabels are also being closely 
observed under the WTO microscope. 
WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), used to 
lecture "misguided conservationists" not to use trade measures to influence foreign 
fishing practices. Instead, GATT insisted, informing consumers through labeling would 
be a more efficient and effective method that would not impede trade. But now that such 
labeling systems exist, WTO is saying that labels informing consumers are themselves 
barriers to trade because they might discriminate against imports. 
Recently, Alaskan fishermen requested Senator Frank Murkowski to sponsor legislation 
requiring seafood labeling. The Trade Adjustment Assistance Act (S. 1209) thus would 
require all U.S . fish and shellfish labels to inform consumers of country of origin, how 
the fish was harvested (wild or farmed), and whether the fish is a genetically modified 
organism (GMO). However, the WTO has already ruled (or indicated that it could rule) 
against onerous labeling measures targeted against exporting nations. · While the WTO 
already has rules on labeling by country of origin for most goods, food (and fish) 
products are still exempt, thanks to intensive lobbying by global food companies: 
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< As this article is being written, conferees are now busy negotiating the final versions of 
the Farm Bill in Congress. In the Senate version (S. 1731) is Senator Ted Stevens' (R-
AK) similar language (requested by fishennen) that would also finally require seafood to 
be labeled by nation of origin and whether it is wild or farmed. This innocuous language 
is badly needed, but could nevertheless be determined by the WTO to be a non-tariff 
measure, and if so the U.S. would be required either to eliminate it or face trade sanctions 
and penalties. 
The rising tied of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) that are hitting world markets 
are also of major concern to scientists and the general public. However, the WTO has 
already ruled that governments may not "discriminate" against imports based on how 
something was produced, for instance by traditional and sustainable versus industrial and 
destructive methods of production. Under this rubric, other nations' initiatives to label 
genetically engineered species are already being threatened with WTO action. 
Eco-labels, such as the Marine Stewardship Council's (MSC) program for sustain ably 
harvested seafood products, are also directly threatened by WTO's new mandate given in 
Doha, including the recent certification by MSC of Alaskan salmon as a sustainable 
fishery. Trade ministers specified in the Doha Summit's final declaration that eco-labels 
would be closely observed and assessed for their impacts on trade. Some nations have 
already made clear their intentions to challenge eco-labels as discriminatory under the 
WTO's free trade rules. However you might feel about such labeling schemes, this attack, 
if successful, would also eliminate another type of eco-Iabel most fishermen support, the 
labeling of wild versus farmed seafood products. 
The WTO also restrains governments from taking precautionary measures to prevent the 
entry of invasive species and foreign diseases. Canada has already successfully 
challenged Tasmania's ban on salmon eggs, imposed because of possible entry of foreign 
salmon diseases willi foreign eggs. The Sanitary & Phyto-Sanitary (or SPS) Agreement 
of the WTO does not recognize the precautionary principle at all when allowing 
governments to implement protections at the border. The burden of proof is thus always 
on the public to prove something is NOT safe, never on the industries to prove that it is. 
U.S. Congressman Nick Rahal (D-WV) has proposed the Invasive Species & Coastal 
Protection Act eH.R. 3558) to set up a comprehensive national program to protect native 
fish and wildlife from the impacts of invasive species. In drafting such bills, however, 
lawmakers are discouraged from enacting any meaningfully precautionary measures, on 
the theory that such measures would impede global trade and thus could be slapped down 
by the WTO. 
In short, the NTM elimination agenda has become the final push by major multi-national 
corporations to remove all national or regional governmental controls over natural 
resources like fisheries. If their full agenda is ultimately adopted, any nation's policies or 
regulations for the conservation of important biological resources, or for the protection of 
the communities tl:at depend upon those resources, would become subservient to 
expanding global trade requirements. 
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fishermen can no longer sell their products since import barriers were lifted to allow 
industrial trawlers from other Asian nations to flood local markets. Salmon fishermen 
along the Pacific Coast of the U.S. cannot compete with below-cost imports of farmed 
salmon from Chile, where export aquaculture that damages coastal habitat and requires 
massive amount of antibiotics is also being fought by local artisanal fishermen , 
indigenous peoples, workers, and conservationists. These are but two examples of a 
worldwide problem. 
The expansion of global trade and investment overseen by the WTO has created a crisis 
in rural communities everywhere. Fluctuating global commodity prices have destabilized 
local communities and made long-term planning for natural resource protections 
impossible. Trade rules need to give communities and nations the right to do whatever is 
necessary to protect sustainable resource management practices and the livelihoods those 
resources support. 
Subsidies: The WTO Swings Its Axe Again 
One of the major fisheries problems covered in the Doha Summit was the problem of the 
world's badly overcapitalized fishing fleets, with several proposals for cutting national 
subsidies that maintain fleets too large for the available fish resource. 
This item on the Doha agenda, which at first glance may appear innocuous if not helpful, 
could easily turn out to be a corporate Trojan horse. Embedded within it are hidden 
agendas of large corporations for capturing what is left of the planet's fisheries resources. 
While governments absolutely need to cut subsidies and reduce overcapacity in their 
fishing industry, the WTO is not the appropriate place to handle this problem. Letting a 
trade body, whose main constituents are global trading firms and not people tied to the 
land and sea, decide which subsidies are allowable almost ensures that what happened to 
small scale family farmers under the WTO 's last round wiil now be repeated with the 
world's small scale family fishermen. 
Beyond the WTO's well-documented history of cutting subsidies for the poor while 
further enriching the wealthy, the true. WTO agenda for dealing with fisheries subsidies is 
revealed by who has been at the table in the discussion to date. Attempts by national 
networks of fishermen's organizations (including PCFFA) to get a seat at the negotiating 
table have been ignored, while the U.S. trade association of importers, processors, and 
distributors (the National Fisheries Institute) has long been an official advisor to U.S. 
trade negotiators. Some environmental organizations involved with the WTO seem to be 
playing into this strategy as well, despite being informed repeatedly of the concerns of 
small fishermen's organizations. 
The Doha Summit text mentions the subject of fisheries subsidies under the section 
calling for the strengthening of the Agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (Anti-Dumping). But the language contains no explicit conservation mandate, 
nor even an implied one. Indeed, its only specific directive is "taking into account the 
importance of this sector to developing countries," which likely signals an orientation 
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toward maximizing and industrializing the exports of fish products from poor countries, 
where, not coincidentally, some wealthy nations are increasingly investing in foreign 
fishing because they have over-fished their own territories. 
It is still not clear how the WTO will be defining "fisheries subsidies." If past 
negotiations on farming subsidies are any guide, definitions can range as far as the largest 
multinationals can stretch them. With no clear conservation mandate, it is hard to say 
how the WTO's Doha Declaration will impact federally financed programs specifically 
intended to develop more selectivelless destructive fisheries, or efforts to restore habitat, 
or for the buyback of excessive fleet capacity and permits (including through the Capital 
Construction Fund), to guarantee retirement accounts for fishermen, or to provide 
marketing assistance (such as Alaska, Oregon and California's seafood marketing 
commissions). If any of these important programs are deemed "fisheries subsidies" they 
could ultimately be declared violations of the WTO rules, exposing the U.S. to stiff 
sanctions. 
Investment: Freeing Finance 
The WTO's current rules apply mostly to international trade in goods and services. But 
the Doha Summit agenda would also expand the WTO's powers to cover foreign 
investment. If accepted and implemented by WTO member nations, citizens would lose 
enormous power to regulate foreign capital through their own governments, threatening 
fisheries resources in a number of ways. Around the world, many state and local 
governments grant commercial fishing licenses based on various criteria, such as fleet 
sizes, standards of gear, and residency requirements ("fish here, live here" policies). 
Trade negotiators (especially from nations with substantial long-distance fleets looking 
for new fishing grounds to exploit) view these kinds of measure as "discriminatory" 
against foreign investors and are trying to use the WTO process to prohibit all WTO 
member nations from using them. 
Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs) may also be seriously impacted by new WTO 
investment rules. The capital-rich nations, looking to "liberalize" markets for themselves, 
want to make it so that any time any member government privatizes a public entity (say, 
state-owned companies, social services or even concessions to exploit natural resources), 
they must do so only according to new WTO rules. Thus, conditions imposed on IFQ 
systems to protect fishermen and fishing communities could be threatened by WTO 
investment ['-lIes. 
One of the other main principles pushed by the United States and the European Union is a 
ban on so-called "performance requirements." Performance requirements can be any 
government condition or standard placed on a foreign investor to ensure that local 
communities accrue atkast some benefit from the foreign investment, as opposed to 
simply being economically sucked dry. When the U.S. Congress approved IFQs, for 
instance, a number of requirements were put in place, such as limits on ownership of 
quota shares by non-fishermen (i.e., corporations). These protective measures are 
precisely the kind that global corporations could challenge as "discriminatory" and as 
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"unfair barriers to trade" under new WTO investment rules. If such WTO challenges 
were successful in overturning ownership limits, then large foreign investment 
corporations, turning real commercial fishermen into a new variety of sharecropper, 
would gradually dominate IFQ programs. 
The investment agenda's worst element, according to many critics, is the "Investor-State 
Mechanism," which already exists under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and which the U.S. would like to universalize via the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) Agreement and through the WTO. By establishing new legal 
protections for foreign investors, this policy allows private corporations to sue a foreign 
government for enacting measures that reduce the planned profits of the foreign investor. 
Under NAFTA, for instance, a Canadian chemical manufacturer is now suing the U.S. 
govemment for projected profits lost because of California's recent legislative ban on the 
fuel-additive MTBE. Even though the state's fresh water supply is now being heavily 
contaminated by cancer-causing MTBE, and even though the cleanup of that pollution 
may now cost California billions of dollars, the foreign investor is demanding cash 
compensation from the U.S. government of nearly one billion dollars for losing its MTBE 
market because of the state ban on what is clearly a dangerous pollutant. 
Allowing "regulatory takings" of this sort would make it impossible to protect our 
environment from whatever environmental assault some foreign investor figured to make 
money off of. Among other things, it might make dam removal, watershed restoration 
and limits on clear-cut logging, all necessary for salmon restoration, nearly impossible, 
and then only at great cost to the taxpayer. The corporations and their investors, who 
make money from destroying those watersheds, would thus have to be paid "protection 
money" not to continue their destruction. 
Usurping Global Governance: WTO Takeover of the UN 
On the global level, one of the Doha Summit's most stunning results was the mandate to 
negotiate "clarifications" between the WTO rules and the many trade measures that 
already enforce multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Under this process, the 
many existing UN treaties protectin·g migratory fisheries and global habitat could be 
institutionally subordinated to the rights of multi-national corporations established under 
WTO. 
We may havc already seen a smoking gun on this major policy change: The UN 
Straddling Stocks Agreement (a direct result of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio) 
established rules on how nations will collaborate to manage fisheries that migrate across 
national borders. In accordance with that Agreement, and at the request of traditional 
fishing communities in northern Chile, Spanish ships were blocked from landing their 
swordfish catch in Chile because they were depleting the spawning grounds for the 
species in the eastern Pacific Ocean. Docking only to transship onto ships serving the 
lucrative U.S. market, the Spanish government quickly got the European Union to 
threaten a WTO challenge against Chile's blocking of the transport of those goods 
through its waters. An "arrangement" was then negotiated under the WTO auspices that 
I 
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effectively reversed the ban imposed by Chile, letting Spain continue to transship its 
swordfish to U.S. markets while continuing to over fish the species, and forcing 81ile's 
coastal fisheries communities to compete with capital and technology intensive Spanish 
vessels that are so intensively mining the fishery that it may soon biologically collapse. 
The United Nations Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO) has observer status in 
several WTO committees but seems to do little critical analysis of WTO policies. Indeed, 
FAO has a cooperative arrangement with the WTO to help national fisheries ministries 
implement the WTO's trade rules. 
Such international environmental agreements, negotiated by treaty, need to be defended 
because they protect community rights to resources and natural resources. Examples of 
WTO efforts to undo them abound: efforts to regulate the import of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs ), such as Senator Murkowski's and Stevens' labeling efforts 
mentioned earlier, are fully allowed under the UN Bio-safety Protocol, but could also be 
challenged as a barrier to trade by WTO rules. The Basel Convention on the Trade in 
Hazardous Waste could also be jeopardized by t'1e WTO rules preventing measures that 
block imports, even the import of hazardous materials that may be unwelcome by the 
nation receiving it. Many other examples could be cited. 
References 
Brdidges news digest, WTO group on rules discusses negotiating agenda, fisheries 
subsidies, (march,2002). 
Charnovitz S; Environmental trade sanctions and the GAIT: An Analysis of the Pelly 
Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices. 
Suam;e D.V; the common fisheries policy and the challenge of economic globalization 
(November 2000). 
Dawkins K.; Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy Minneapolis, FISHERIES AND 
THE WTO Minnesota USA, June 1999 
Implication for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in the Less Advantaged Developing 
Countries by the Agency for International Trade, Information and Cooperation (AITIC) 
and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), An AITIC/FAO Workshop, Geneva, 
1998, Uruguay Round Agreements 
Audun, L.; F AO Fact Sheet for WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico 
Fisheries Trade Issues in WTO, The WTO Doha round and Fisheries what's at stake. 
(July 2003) 
Mathrani, S; VJTO panel backs India, says EC tariffs anti-GAIT, http://econornictimes. 
indiatimes.comlcms.dll/articleshow?msid=174443 
216 
Morton, S.C.The Use Of Trade Sanctions In Multilateral Environmental Agreements And 
The Interaction With Gatt: Flipper Meets Gattzilla, A Discussion Paper (1996, 1998). 
M .Victor, S .Glen and G.zeke,Fishermen's News of not fish-friendly: The WTO's New 
Doha Agenda for Fisheries, April, 2002. 
Paper presented at the Workshop on the Role of Financial Institutions in Strengthening 
National Fisheries Industries and Pri vatization of Fisheries Investments in Small island 
Developing States, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 24-28 June 1996. 
Ruckes, E. Senior Fishery Industry Officer (Marketing) FAO, Rome, Italy, The code of 
conduct for responsible fisheries: implications for Caribbean states 
Tarasofsky. R. G. Regional fisheries organization and the world trade organization 
compatibility or conflict. 
Ted L. McDorman Protecting international marine living resources with trade embargoes: 
GATT and international reaction to U.S. practices 
World Trade Organization, deploying 'free trade' to destroy nations From Executive 
ntelligence Review, November, 1999., http://www.nex.net.aui users/reidgck/ 
WTODEP.HTM 
217 
